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Abstract: Being heavily energy dependent, it is not much of a surprise that Europe pays special attention 
to reducing the use of fossil fuels. Each one of the ten new member states is characterized by relatively low 
per capita energy consumption and relatively low energy efficiency, and the share of renewables in their 
energy mix tends to be low, too. The paper examines the problem, when the policy measures create a 
decrease in environmental capital instead of an increase. In this case it hardly seems justified to talk about 
environmental protection.   
The authors describe a case of a rapeseed oil mill which would not be of too much interest on its own but 
given that almost all similar plants went bankrupt, there are some important lessons to learn from its 
survival. The enterprise the authors examined aimed at establishing a micro-regional network. They 
completed a brown-field development to establish a small plant on the premises of a former large 
agricultural cooperative. By partnering with the former employees and suppliers of the sometime 
cooperative, they enjoyed some benefits which all the other green-field businesses focusing on fuel 
production could not. The project improved food security, energy security and population retention as well.  
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I. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN EUROPE AND IN HUNGARY 
 
We have examined the Hungarian legislation and environmental performance from an European 
perspective The IMD in Switzerland publishes yearly a competitiveness report, in which they 
evaluates the country’s performance in many dimensions. Based on the ranks we can create clusters 
according the difference between the overall and the environmental performance. There are five 
group of European countries: 
To the first group belongs countries like Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, where the overall 
performance is good and the environmental performance is excellent. In this countries not only the 
so called eco-efficiency is high but the environmental assets like arabic land per capita and the 
urbanisation level are favourable. So they have good environmental assets. (The ecological footprint 
is not too big.) 
To the second group belong countries where the overall performance is in harmony with the 
environmental performance like Denmark, France, Germany, Italy. In all this countries the 
favourable natural environment is combined with a relatively lower level (in European term) of 
population density and urbanisation. 
The third group contains countries like Hungary, Spain, Poland where the environmental 
performance is much better than the overall performance, what is the "gratis effect" of the under 
development and the favourable natural circumstances (fertile soil, low urbanisation level etc.) 
The fourth group contains totally different countries with relatively good overall but weaker 
environmental performance like Norway, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland. In this group the 
problem mainly not the week environmental management, in most cases the high population density 
and/or the overgrowth economy (high per capita energy consumption), the high level of 
urbanisation are typical. 
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The fifth group of countries, where both the overall performance and the environment are 
unfavourable. In this cases, the environmental infrastructure is weaker like in Greece, or in the 
Czech Republic. 
It would be a mistake to over evaluate the reliability of the above mentioned data, but  interestingly 
one can see some correlation   
Historically EU environmental policy has mostly had the declared objective of integrating 
environmental policy with other sector policies. The relatively "autonomous" role assigned to 
environmental policy does not necessarily lead to a weak system, although it does mean that if the 
economy as a whole fails to support the objectives set forth by that policy, then environmental 
policy is doomed to failure.  
 
EU environmental policy has moved from direct 'command and control' regulations to the declared 
objective of subsidiarity and, by now, it is employing the entire gamut of control mechanisms, the 
system of 'voluntary agreements' being one of its more recent additions. Early government policies, 
as almost all measures at the birth of the environmental protection, were reactions to specific crises. 
In other words, like the measures themselves, environmental policy at that time was 'reactive' in 
character. While 'end-of-pipe technologies' will most likely remain irreplaceable for some time  to 
come in areas such as environmental rehabilitation, sewage or waste treatment,  a 'reactive 
environmental policy' is always the result of a backward political system. In Hungary, the biggest 
problem, besides a poorly developed institutional structure, is a distrust of already functioning 
institutions.  
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In the table below we collected the major characteristics of the two 'basic approaches' to 
environmental policy on the macro level:  
 
 
characteristics of... "reactive env. policy" "preventive env. policy" 
government  
control 
sector-specific,  ministry of the 
environment  
the env. ministry playing an 
integrative, co-ordinating role 
problem management differentiated by env. media and nature 
of pollution 
integrated, holistic 
control tools command and control: penalties, 
product charges,  user charges, 
subsidies 
environ-friendly tax system, 
voluntary agreements, EMAS, 
early warning and emergency 
systems,  
educational campaigns 
foundations of 
environmental 
economics 
Pigou's theory of the internalisation of 
negative externalities 
Coase, and theory of institutional 
economics 
typical activities of 
env. bureaucracy 
inspection, punishment, licensing, 
damage control 
planning, co-operative problem 
solving, professional expertise 
technical solutions for 
the protection of the 
environment 
"end-of-pipe" technologies cleaner production and 
consumption methods 
financing central budget, allocated funds private sector, local government, 
foundations 
measuring 
effectiveness 
env. expenditures in % of GDP, % of 
pollution reduction 
welfare indicators (ISEW, HDI), 
biodiversity index, public 
awareness, changed life-style 
time-line of results temporary, superficial, appearing in the 
short run 
lasting results, appearing after 
some delay 
participation of 
stakeholders 
within a closed circle, 'greens' are the 
enemy 
broad-based, civic groups as 
partners 
environmental sector developed env. industry and 
counselling system 
educational programmes, 
information systems, clean 
technology advisors 
 
Remarks: the table contains only those tools and theories that have already seen practical 
application.  
 
The two extreme positions are never manifested in their pure form in practice, they always overlap 
at some point; the phenotype of the system is determined by the frequency of occurrence and the 
weight of constituting elements.  
The transition between the two stages of development is full of contradictions. On macro, as well as 
micro level, development is hindered by existing structural factors. On the micro level, managers 
are reluctant to risk replacing well functioning (e.g. profitable) technologies under given 
circumstances, an understandable position when seen from the point of systems-theory. On the 
macro level, at the same time, the environmental policies of developed nations are rather ineffective. 
Although environmental trends in efficiency point in a positive direction, there are no signs of real 
improvement in absolute terms. It is precisely the failure of the system that should spur change on 
the macro level, yet it is the present structure itself that resists any movement. And the failure of 
'reactive environmental policy' is evident both in the legal and economic spheres. In practice, even 
rigorous theory resists application. In addition, a number of elements making up EU environmental 
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policies cannot stand up to theoretical analysis. For instance, some of its basic assumptions, such as 
the principle of  'polluter pays', can only be accepted on moral grounds, but often lacks economic 
rational. It is well known that on occasion protection against harmful effects by the 'victim' would 
be more economical, in which case the principle of 'polluter pays' harms the Pareto optimum.  
It would be easy to prove with numbers that in Hungary development projects, financed by incomes 
from fuel product charges (i.e. catalytic converter programme, the phase-out of two-stroke engines) 
have contributed to increased motorisation and the decline of mass transit and, instead of reducing, 
have actually boosted per capita fuel consumption. If we consider anticipated difficulties attending 
the recycling of used auto parts, coming up in a few years, the programme's environmental equation 
is even more discouraging. Many may assume that we are mismanaging these programmes. The 
problem lies somewhere else, however; it is the entire concept of 'reactive environmental policy' 
that creates these unintended results. 
 
In all developed countries governments reacted to environmental problems with encouraging the 
emergence of an independent environmental ministry. In institutional terms this has led to a 
contradiction. Environmental policy which, we are convinced, should be integrated into economic 
and other sector policies, is segregated and downgraded, eventually becoming one of several sectors 
of the economy. Turning environmental issues into an industry is a natural 'developmental 
deficiency', the result of a functional division of labour. Environmental policy should attempt, more 
than anything else, to slow economic expansion, to work out and support, with the help of pressure 
groups, economic activities that reach their target by reducing per-unit fuel consumption and raw 
material requirement, while keeping economic activity within the regenerating capacity of the 
natural environment.  
 
Due to its separate function, the success of the ministry of environment is measured by the size of 
redistributed resources (budget revenues) it receives and the effectiveness of its lobbying efforts. 
However, in this context its vested interests lie in propagating pro-expansionist forces. Does it mean 
that voices questioning the legitimacy of an independent environmental ministry are correct?  With 
the present administrative structure the elimination of the environmental ministry would be a 
mistake; its presence strengthens efforts to protect the environment, competing successfully with 
other areas (i.e. health care, social welfare, etc.) for the scarce resources.  
 
As a result of these contradictions the environmental ministry and the protection of the environment 
do not necessarily share the same interests. A reactive environmental policy actually favours the 
emergence and implementation of sector interests. The environmental bureaucracy, the nascent and 
growing environmental industry all strengthen the ministry's lobbying power, making more funds 
available for environmental protection (end-of-pipe variety) which, in the final analysis, do end up 
benefiting the environment itself.  
 
In contrast, the lobbying power of a preventive environmental policy is considerably more limited. 
Improvements in the environment in this case are not simply due to the efforts of the environmental 
sector. In a preventive system the environmental industry remains weak and lacks independence, 
fewer budgetary resources come available for environmental projects and the ministry loses some 
'respect' which, in the public eye is tied to the size of its budget. It is hardly reasonable to expect the 
environmental ministry, after early successes promoting the interests of its sector, to support a 
'preventive environmental policy' that, while increasing its socio-political influence and efficiency, 
would ultimately leave it in a 'weakened position'.  
 
Looking at the problem from the point of system-theory and sector interests, it is clear why in their 
response to the EU questionnaire different ministerial departments were motivated in painting such 
a negative picture of the state of the environment. At the same time the positive image presented 
concerning enforcement issues and the development of the institutional system is equally 
unrealistic. The discrepancy in responses on the state of the environment and institutional structure 
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can be explained quite easily: for ministry officials the state of the environment is something 
beyond their control, caused by outside forces, by 'polluters'. The establishment and improvement of 
institutional structures (including legal instruments) is the responsibility and competence of the 
Ministry of the Environment and Regional Policy, its own 'brain-child', as it were. This is only to be 
expected; every institution has a more critical view of others' work and is inclined to put its own 
achievements in a better light.  
 
NGOs are also pressuring the ministry to present the state of our environment in an unfavourable 
light. NGOs too have a vested interest in interpreting environmental indicators in dramatic terms. 
The bureaucracy, that once sharpened its claws in bargains over planning targets and regulatory 
policy and, lately, in budgetary skirmishes, hopes to take a larger 'bite' out of redistributed revenues 
and anticipated EU subsidies. 
 
The negative image on the state of the environment, more than anything else, makes EU bureaucrats 
wonder how all needed infrastructure development and environmental rehabilitation projects could 
be financed. The favourable image on the institutional system, on the other hand, raises doubts 
about its efficiency - if the system works so well, why is the environment in such a poor state.  
 
II. EU EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Being heavily energy dependent, it is not much of a surprise that Europe pays special 
attention to reducing the use of fossil fuels and to exploring and promoting the 
employment of renewable energy sources. In order to fight climate change, member states 
made the following commitments for 2020 at the European Council Summit of 8-9 March 
20072:  
• Reduce carbon-dioxide emissions by 20 percent 
• Improve energy efficiency by 20 percent 
• Increase share of renewable energy in the EU energy mix to 20 percent 
• Increase the share of biofuels to 10 percent 
The decision was criticized even before it was made. Not only for being premature and 
lacking any and all background calculations but also because these amounts are simply not 
sufficient from a climate change point-of-view. Green NGOs (like Friends of the Earth) 
claim a 60-70 percent reduction in emissions is needed. According to the above-cited 
WETO project, Europe will only achieve 10 percent by 2050. The 20 percent reduction 
thus even contradicts the EU’s own professional forecasts and what is more, is quite 
marginal in importance considering climate change. The best we can say about these 
commitments is that they might indicate that the EU believes climate change to be a real 
threat and that they are ready to make efforts to avoid a catastrophe. The Copenhagen 
Climate Conference did not bring anything new to the table, either. The only thing the 
world’s countries could agree on was that they should keep making the necessary efforts. 
European emission reduction achievements have been very contradictory. Table 2 shows 
commitments vs. actual data on the energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions of 
fifteen countries (using a ranking of the top thirty). 
                                                          
2
 Data source: Presentation of Professor István Láng at Corvinus University of Budapest, April 2009. 
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TABLE 2: ENERGY CONSUMPTION RANKING OF CERTAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (from amongst 
the first 30) SOURCE: Eurostat 
 
Per capita 
consumption 
Consumption 
per unit GDP 
Distance from 
carbon dioxide 
emission target 
Share of 
renewables 
Austria 19 5 18 4 
Belgium 25 18 10 15 
Bulgaria 6 29 5 28 
Czech 
Republic 
16 28 1 17 
Denmark 17 4 11 2 
Estonia 16 28 1 24 
Finland 28 25 21 3 
France 23 11 18 14 
Germany 22 10 8 7 
Hungary 8 17 9 26 
Ireland 20 3 29 16 
Italy 11 1 15 9 
Latvia 3 20 2 22 
Norway 27 12 19 10 
Poland 5 22 6 20 
It is quite apparent that the commitments mentioned, while requiring serious efforts 
from some of the countries, do not constitute a problem at all to some others.   
Surprisingly enough, Finland, though usually considered a pioneer of environmental 
protection, lags far behind – not only because of its high per capita consumption but also 
because of its per unit GDP consumption. Something similar applies to Norway, as well, 
even though both countries boast very favorable advantages concerning renewable energy 
production thanks to their hydropower resources.  
These rankings also confirm the well-known fact that rich countries tend to have higher per 
capita but lower per unit GDP energy consumption while the exact opposite applies to poor 
states.  
These trends are not changed between 1997-2007 (Figure 1) and are not too much of a 
surprise, but according to Figure 1 and Table 2 the aforementioned ”uniform” commitment 
of the EU states is rather hard to interpret.  
Each one of the ten new member states is characterized by relatively low per capita 
energy consumption and relatively low energy efficiency, and the share of renewables in 
their energy mix tends to be low, too. This situation clearly calls for energy policies which 
improve both energy efficiency and the share of renewables in the energy mix. It is not 
only carbon emissions but also energy security and the non renewable character of fossil 
fuel reserves which justifies increased interest in opportunities to employ biomass or wind 
energy. Many consider the renewable energy industry a potentially lucrative area for 
investment. 
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FIGURE 1:  CHANGES IN COUNTRIES’ PER CAPITA CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS BETWEEN 
1997-2007 SOURCE: Eurostat 
III. DECISION DILEMMAS ABOUT RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES 
 
All green NGOs find it desirable to support the spread of so-called “green energy”, 
though there are debates about the exact details. Some opt for wind power, some for 
biofuels while others demand increased subsidies for geothermal energy production.  
In table 3. we describe three cases which tend to divide the public. ”Stakeholders” 
(entrepreneurs, government, NGOs and others) are all part of a so-called “decision game” 
and, not having read the book of János Neumann3, they believe that the objective of the 
“game” is to win. Whereas one should rather decide first what kind of game they are 
actually playing. In our examples, the stakeholders and especially the government and the 
NGOs believe the game to be about environmental protection. Those in support of wind 
turbines, of increasing the mandatory bioethanol or biodiesel mixing rate and of the natural 
gas program are acting for a good cause by supporting environmental protection. Both the 
government and NGOs are convinced that the purpose of using renewable energies is to 
slow down the exhaustion of natural resources and to reduce the emission of greenhouse 
gases. Both of these objectives can be related to sustainable development and 
environmental protection. Thus the decision “game” appears to be about environmental 
protection. But is it really? Let us take a look at what the environment “gains” and how 
                                                          
3
 János Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their book „Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” more than sixty 
years ago in 1944. Even on its 60th anniversary it was only a very small group from the professional elite who celebrated the 
authors even though their work has revolutionalized economic thought. There have been many works from many authors on 
the economic applications of game theory ever since – but even today, it is the ’imperative to win’ that springs to one’s mind 
when games are being discussed. But the most important thing about any game is to know what type of game one is playing. 
Concerning environmental protection and sustainable development, it is very important for us, environmental economists, to 
ask ourselves the question: do we know what type of game we are playing? 
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environmental conditions improve through the use of wind power, bioethanol or a natural 
gas program. 
 
TABLE 3: ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE RELATED “GAMES” BETWEEN 
NGOS AND THE ECONOMY 
 
Replacing fossil fuels or 
reducing their negative 
effects 
 
 
NGOs believe the game to be 
about… 
 
The game is actually about… 
1. Biofuels 
Renewable energies to slow 
down resource exhaustion, 
reduce carbon emission 
Rural development, energy 
security 
2. Wind generators Renewable, no carbon dioxide 
emission 
Utilization of drought areas, 
local energy production 
3. Natural gas program 
 
Improve energy efficiency, 
reduce air pollution 
Supply security, reduce urban 
air pollution  
It is apparent from Table 3 that “environmentalist” arguments for the natural gas 
program, biofuels or wind power plants are rather weak ones. Remember: all three 
solutions have received or are still receiving state subsidies which are labeled 
’environmental’. Though any one of them might be useful under certain conditions, all 
three solutions are marginal innovations only, thus none of them should qualify for 
unconditional support irrespective of location, time and social conditions. Cost-benefit 
analyses could yield either a positive or a negative present value depending on the actual 
parameters. In all cases, results heavily depend on the framework within which they are 
evaluated.  
If and when the measures introduced because of a given decision result in a decrease in 
environmental capital instead of an increase then it hardly seems justified to talk about 
environmental protection. The fault lies in the definition of the game itself – in the above 
cases and in many other situations as well. Mentioning pro-environmental arguments for 
bioethanol or biodiesel as renewable sources of energy is not exactly reasonable. 
’Environmental protection’ and ’automobilism’ are paradoxical concepts already. One 
could, however, look into the effects of bioethanol production on employment or rural 
development and it is quite possible that both cultures along with their upstream industries 
could qualify for subsidies in that very framework.  
The issue of renewable energy sources might be considered an “energy security decision 
game”, accepting the self-sufficiency rate and import dependence to be strategic questions, 
thus the construction of wind turbines might turn out to be a reasonable choice in this very 
game. As an environmental protection decision game, however, no sound solution exists to 
this problem. If we wanted to turn the aforementioned solutions into economically sound 
choices, we would soon get to the issues of, in the case of bioethanol, GMOs and industry-
like production systems, which are taboo to environmentalists (for good reasons, most 
probably). Wind turbines would lead us to thinking about water reservoirs like the one 
planned at Prédikálószék (plans for the hydroelectric power station Bős-Nagymaros 
included a pumped storage reservoir here in a site of natural beauty in Pilis mountains), 
and today’s “greens” would for sure not be very enthusiastic about it either. All the above 
leads us to one conclusion: before participating in meetings to make decisions, we really 
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should consider what type of “game” we are playing and whether we have the necessary 
competence for the role. Since if we do not know the game or if it is not us who should be 
sitting there but we still happen to win - that will only bring trouble on all of us.  
In Hungary, where there is hardly any wind according to scientific meteorological 
statistics, the actual installation of the already permitted wind power capacity of about 350 
MW seems unavoidable, and investors’ expectations are even estimated at several times 
this figure. Soon, the next “permit race” is about to start. An important question is: what 
would happen to the Hungarian energy system if, for some environmental/economic policy 
reasons, the government decided to leave alone the -apparently liberalized, but actually 
subsidy-driven- market? 
As environmental economists, we are worried about subsidies for bioethanol and 
biodiesel production. No matter how hard we try to cover it up, these subsidies are 
definitely harmful from an environmental point-of-view. These subventions make fuel 
cheaper than it would be without them which indirectly fosters the expansion of 
automobilism – though it should rather be decreased worldwide, and even more so in 
Europe. It is a known fact that, in Hungary, the use of bioethanol as a fuel and bringing in 
wind turbines to the existing electricity system is only possible with strong and continuous 
state support.  
The real price of energy itself is changing rapidly, yet recently we witnessed substantial 
price changes within relatively short periods of time instead of the usual few percent 
fluctuations. From USD 60 per barrel in February 2007 crude oil prices rose to USD 145 a 
barrel in July 2008. Then a downward trend followed with the price finally dropping to 
USD 30 in February 2009, yet again bouncing back to USD 70 per barrel by September 
20094. With oil prices above USD 100, pretty much any type of renewable energy seems 
competitive and rate-of-return calculations in the energy sector indicate incredible 
opportunities for innovation. Then energy prices had halved in a couple of weeks thus any 
previous calculations became invalid right away.  
Accordingly, Europe and the world have seen the rapid spreading of corn and rape fields 
during the last two years. Processing plants also started to appear, and then the experiences 
of one single year turned previous evaluations upside down. And it was not only crude oil 
prices changing dramatically, but also, something “turned out” that has for long been 
known by many: biomass is sourced from where our food comes from, thus the two types 
of use are in competition. In 2008, bioethanol became very economic because of high 
crude oil prices and mandatory mix rates artificially fueled the market boom as well. 
Demand for corn-based bioethanol drove corn prices to heights which poor people could 
no longer afford, causing starvation in Mexico and in some other regions of the world. 
Sure enough, there are some who found other explanations. According to New Energy 
Finance, the use of grain for bio-fuel production “only” accounts for 8.1 percent of the 
total increase in food prices. As they put it: “In grains, during the period from 2004 to 
April 2008, global dollar prices increased by an average of 168 percent. The rising price of 
oil accounts for an increase of 32.5 percent and other inputs - such as land and labor costs - 
contributed 7.4 percent. Dollar depreciation accounts for a further 17.9 percent. Supply and 
demand imbalances account for the remaining 57.7 percent, with biofuels responsible for 
up to an 8.1 percent increase in global average grain prices (the impact on U.S. corn was 
clearly above average). The biggest issues were failure to improve yields to compensate 
                                                          
4
 Source: WTI Crude Oil Database: Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
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for global population growth, along with the failure of the Australian harvest". (LaMonica, 
Martin: 2008) 
The evaluation we cited above did not really clear things up but rather provided further 
proof that averages tend to cover the truly important matters and that a universal energy 
policy cannot be right, not even in today’s globalized world. An 8.1 percent average price 
increase does not seem too much, indeed, yet in some regions, it might very well be 
enough for some to die of hunger. 
IV. EXPERIENCES FROM A SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVE THINKING BUSINESS VENTURE 
ENERGY PRODUCTION, RURAL DEVELOPMENT OR …? 
Back in 2007, the owners of an existing business decided to contribute to the EU 
renewable energies strategy: they founded a rapeseed oil mill for producing biodiesel raw 
material – a true model plant from a sustainability perspective. They employed an 
integrated approach to all the social, political and economic dimensions and ecological-
environmental aspects and thus developed a tailor-made strategy for the given conditions. 
Sustainability was also accounted for in the location decision-making process. The primary 
objective was to find an agricultural region where a sufficient amount of rape could be 
produced in a 50-60 km range, as by minimizing transportation distance one can decrease 
both transportation costs and the burden on the environment.  
As for all business ventures, profit maximization was the primary goal – but social and 
environmental benefits were also taken into account, knowing that in the long run, these 
would actually bring even more serious benefits for the business as well.  
The plant started its activities in the renovated buildings of a former agricultural 
cooperative. Today, it has six employees. Thanks to the processing of 5200 tons of rape 
annually and related logistics needs, downstream employment benefits are significant. The 
plant now has a processing capacity of 430 tons of rapeseed in a month, which yields 150 
tons (170000 liters) of rapeseed oil and 280 tons of rape pellet.  
The plant we have been presented is located in Transdanubia and produces crude 
rapeseed oil, a raw material for biodiesel production. If it was not for the law, this oil could 
well be used to fuel agricultural and other machines or a power generator, thereby 
providing for the electric energy needed by the plant itself (i.e. a rapeseed oil-fueled 
generator). Oil sales constitute the majority of the plant’s income. Rape pellet may serve as 
livestock fodder or be used in pellet stoves as well. Ideally, rape production, oil milling, 
livestock farming and the energy production infrastructure should all be within a 60 km 
range. Calculations suggest that approximately 5000 hectares of rape acreage is what it 
takes to operate an economically sustainable system. In such a case, there is no need for 
long-haul transportation and crop rotation becomes possible.  
Following heavy fluctuations, the rapeseed market stabilized in summer 2009. The price 
for rapeseed settled at HUF 63000 per ton. Considering price and cost levels from 2009, 
the plant can be operated economically (as 3 tons of rapeseed yield 1 ton of rapeseed oil 
and 2 tons of pellets): (1 [t rapeseed oil] x 620 [EUR/t] x 270 [HUF/EUR] ) + (2 [t pellet] x 
37.000 [HUF/t]) – 3 [t rapeseed] x 63.000 [HUF/t] = 52.000 [HUF]  
According to estimates by Oil World (AgroLine, 2009), the EU harvested a record 
amount of rapeseed in 2009. In 2010 the rapeseed crop totaled 20.12 million tons which 
even exceeds the previous year’s record figure of 18.91 million tons. 
In spite of the above calculations, there is no reason for optimism, as it is uncertain how 
over-production will affect the market. Neither do we know how slow or fast our 
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emergence from the crisis will be and how that will influence the crude oil market, which, 
as we have indicated earlier, fundamentally determines rapeseed oil prices. 
TABLE 4: FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL, RAPESEED OIL AND RAPESEED AS A 
RESULT OF THE CRISIS (2007-2009)  
SOURCE: Compiled by the authors based on data from rapeseed oil millers  
 Crude oil price  
(USD / barrel) 
Rapeseed oil price  
(EUR / t) 
Rapeseed price  
(thousand HUF / t) 
July 2007 75 580 50 
July 2008 145 1100 110 
Dec. 2008 35 600 70 
Sept. 2009 70 620 63 
Rapeseed oil prices are closely related to changes in crude oil prices as it is shown in 
table 4.  In July 2007, rapeseed cost HUF 50.000 per ton, while it was already HUF 
110.000 per ton at the time of harvest. This figure is not that surprising when compared to 
rapeseed oil prices which rose from EUR 580 per ton to EUR 1100 per ton following a 
similar trend (they fell back to EUR 600 per ton by 2009 and are now around EUR 620 per 
ton). Experience from the last three decades suggests that it is advisable to buy up at least 
50 percent of one’s annual rapeseed requirement at harvest, when it tends to be the 
cheapest. This is what the present plant did: they bought up 3000 tons at HUF 110.000 per 
ton.  
As a result of the outbreak of the financial crisis in August 2008, the price of rapeseed 
plummeted to HUF 70.000 per ton by December 2008, thus the change in the cost of raw 
materials alone caused losses of HUF 120 million [3.000 t x (110.000 HUF/t-70.000 
HUF/t) = 120.000.000 HUF]. 
The problem is that such businesses are very seriously affected by any change in the 
world in the economic environment. Everything which is somehow related to agriculture in 
the European Union is heavily influenced by the EU’s subsidy policies. But changes in 
energy prices, which are influenced by the operation of the economy as a whole, might 
well be dominated by factors far more powerful than agricultural subsidies – for example, 
the crude oil price fluctuations between USD 145 and 35 we witnessed during the last one 
and a half years. This was a strikingly high level of variability for a time span of only 
eighteen months, no sign of which appeared in any of the forecasts. 
Fluctuations of the past three years have by far surpassed anything considered normal, 
even in the crude oil market – and they are completely new to the agricultural sector, as the 
costs of agricultural inputs used to be rather balanced. The price of biodiesel, however, is 
so closely bound to that of crude oil that any radical change in the latter ruins biodiesel 
initiatives as well. The majority of businesses in this sector are small enterprises, usually 
with strategic investors. The past two years have proved that businesses founded with the 
promise of high incomes and government subsidies in mind are doomed to quick failure 
when exposed to the vagaries of the rapidly fluctuating energy market. Such hectic market 
conditions could only have been survived by companies who had stable financial investors 
able to dampen these impacts and to hedge out some of the risks. Local entrepreneurs, 
having built their businesses on “agricultural potential”, however, rarely have financial 
investment groups as investors. Because of their lack of capital, the immediate sale of the 
end product – rapeseed oil in this case – is an absolute must for them. Thus it may seem 
reasonable (only to the “sensibly minded” environmentalist, of course) to ask the question 
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“should production be considered ‘local’ if the factors for successful production are in the 
hands of global capital?“ 
The rapeseed oil mill we introduced would not be of too much interest on its own but 
given that almost all similar plants went bankrupt, there are some important lessons to 
learn from its survival. One of them is the existence of the aforementioned financial 
investor, allowing for a positive cash flow. Another point is that biomass energy 
production was not the sole purpose for founding this mill. Most rapeseed mills simply 
wanted to produce biodiesel raw material, thereby taking advantage of the EU policy 
prescribing the relevant mandatory mix rates, whereas the enterprise we examined aimed at 
establishing a micro-regional network. They completed a brown-field development to 
establish a small plant on the premises of a former large agricultural cooperative. By 
partnering with the former employees (now farming their own land) and suppliers of the 
sometime cooperative, they enjoyed some benefits which all the other green-field 
businesses focusing on fuel production could not. Its close relations with agricultural 
entrepreneurs guaranteed strong local support for the company. The project improved food 
security (livestock kept on controlled, locally produced fodder), energy security (public 
institutions heated with rapeseed pellet) and population retention (stable jobs) as well. This 
mutual cooperation is something rural people can make a living from. If they realize that 
livestock farming is worth considering, they might very well create the basis for the revival 
of rural farming activities. Cooperation provides for a win-win situation. Neither a 
rapeseed mill, nor livestock farming or biomass heating seems a promising project on its 
own, individually. As part of an industrial-ecological system, however, the undertaking as 
a whole can actually operate economically, and the countryside can also remain a place 
that is worth living in.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent years have showed us that the harmony between environment and economy lies 
with those smaller enterprises which offer significant employment opportunities and thus 
are desirable from a social point-of-view as well. Considering rural development purposes, 
bio-fuel production projects might well be worth supporting as they might provide 
employment for the rural population, improve population retention in these areas and aid in 
maintaining viable rural communities. 
All the above leads to the conclusion that environmental issues require location- and 
time-specific decisions, thus international experiences alone are far from being enough. 
What is good for the US might cause starvation in Mexico. What seems favorable in 
Brussels might appear undesirable in Hungary, and, what is more, the use of land which 
perfectly fits the Great Hungarian Plain might turn out to be nonsense for the 
Transdanubian region. It might happen that rape production remains a rational choice both 
economically and ecologically for a couple of years, yet later on, it might become 
explicitly harmful along any one of these two dimensions, or maybe along both. This 
might seem to suggest leaving everything to chance or to the market (which are quite the 
same for many, by the way). But there is another possible conclusion: the need for flexible 
adaptation – a concept also re-discovered by literature, having received abundant coverage 
in recent years under the name ’resilience’.  
Resilience stands for a decentralized or regionalized type of “planned economy”, as 
opposed to the centrally-planned system we were used to until Hungary’s transition – 
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memories of which we might happen to recall when faced with an EU bureaucracy trying 
to cope with its own managerial challenges. Walker Brian (2005) 
The need for a sustainable relationship between nature and mankind requires us to focus on 
ecological flexibility as it primarily deals with the scale of opportunities between stabilization and 
destabilization: concerning our present development, concerning global environmental changes, the 
loss of biodiversity, degradation of ecosystems and concerning sustainable development.  
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